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In market-oriented economies, high rates of homeowners are traditionally associated with positive economic 
effects and externalities. For this reason, public authorities have encouraged homeownership for the last 
decades through taxation or subsidies policies. In Belgium, owner-occupation has been promoted since the end 
of the nineteenth century and homeownership policy is considered as a key element of the Welfare state. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of these policies is fundamentally based on a clear understanding of what 
determines homeownership. Therefore, the analysis of tenure determinants can provide inputs for the definition 
or the renewal of housing, taxation and subsidies policies. Considering this interest, this paper investigates the 
issue of housing tenure in Belgium. On the basis of previous related research, a model of tenure choice is 
estimated using a sample of 6,962 households. The observations follow clearly the general trends described for 
other countries. Higher income and age, couple status and the presence of dependent children have positive 
influences on homeownership. In addition, locations presenting a high density of population and a high 
centrality are associated with a lower probability of homeownership compared with other areas. The underlying 
significations of these variables are discussed in the paper.  
 





The rate of homeownership varies significantly across the countries of Western Europe (See Fig. 1) 
(Eurostat, 2012). Norway presents the highest level of homeowners (85% of the population1) while 
Switzerland show clearly the lowest (44%). Between these extremes, Spain, Iceland and Greece have 
very high rates of homeowners (from 76% for Greece to 79% in the case of Spain), while Germany 
and Austria have very low (respectively 53% and 58%). Other countries present intermediate 
situations, more or less close to the average situation in the EU-15 (66%). The level of homeowners is 
just below this benchmark in France and Danemark (64% for both) and just above in United Kingdom 
(67%) and the Netherlands (68%). Finally, Sweden, Ireland2, Luxembourg, Italy, Finland and Portugal 
present relatively high homeowners rates, ranging between 70% and 75%.  
 
Belgium is characterized a relatively high level of homeowners. In 2012, 72% of its total population 
owned and lived in its own house or flat (Eurostat, 2012). These homeowners are not equally 
distributed among the 589 municipalities that make up the national territory; a lower rate is observed 
in the large and medium-size cities (See Fig. 2) (DGSEI, 2001). Besides, as shown in table 1, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The reference population used by Eurostat is all private households and their current members residing in the 
territory of the State at the time of data collection.  
2 The 2012 rate of homeowners was not available for Ireland at the time of writing this paper. We consequently 
show the rate for the year 2011.  
	   2 
homeowners are relatively rare in the five major cities of the country. Furthermore, inter-regional 
differences can be raised3. Flanders, the most populated (6,4 million inhabitants) and richest of the 
three Belgian regions, counted 77% of homeowners in 2009, to 73% in Wallonia (3,6 million 
inhabitants) and only 45% in the Brussels-Capital region (1,1 million inhabitants) (Winters & Heylen, 
2013).  
 





Table 1. Rates of homeowners in the five major Belgian cities 
 
 Population (2012) Homeowners (2001) 
Brussels (central municipality only) 166,497 31% 
Brussels-Capital  
(18 surrounding urban municipalities, 
except the central municipality) 
972,357 40% 
Ghent 248,242 52% 
Antwerp 502,604 51% 
Charleroi 203,871 56% 
Liège 195,576 47% 
 
 
In market-oriented economies, high rates of homeowners are traditionally associated with positive 
economic effects and externalities, and an extensive literature exists around this issue. Several studies 
reinforce this opinion. Rossi & Weber (1996) and DiPasquale & Glaeser (1999) report that 
homeownership exerts a beneficial influence on social capital, that they defined as the social links 
among citizens. Green & White (1997) and Haurin, Parcel & Haurin (2002) show that homeownership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For an in-depth research on this issue, see Winters & Heylen (2013).	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provides better conditions for educational outcomes of children. Galster (1983) and Gatzlaff, Green & 
Ling (1998) argue that homeowners take care of their dwellings better than renters. Fischel (2001) 
hypothesizes that homeownership promotes participation in local politics. Moreover, taking the case 
of public schools, Hilber & Mayer (2009) bring evidence that homeowners are inclined to support 
spending in durable local public goods. Turner & Luea (2009) show that homeownership contributes 
to wealth accumulation, especially for low- and moderate-income households. 
 





However, other studies balance these desirable effects. Barker & Miller (2009) show that the 
relationship between homeownership and children outcomes is weaker than previously mentionned. 
Hilber & Mayer (2009) and Hilber (2010) bring evidence that some positive externalities of 
homeownership are confined to densely built areas (with inelastic supply of housing). Due to the 
greater immobility of homeowners (Haurin & Gill, 2002), Oswald (1996) argues that a high level of 
homeownership could contribute to a high level of unemployment. Shiller (2007) highlights the 
harmful consequences on the house prices and the mortgage defaults of the social dependence on 
homeownership. Brueckner (1997) and Hilber (2005) show that homeownership prevents the optimal 
diversification of households' investment portfolio. Finally, Dietz & Haurin (2003) conclude their 
review with several evidences that homeownership has effects on some household behaviors and 
outcomes, but also that the literature on this issue entails important gaps from theoretical and 
econometric points of view. 
 
The benefits of homeownership seem to be predominant in the historical collective mind; increasing 
the levels of homeownership has been one of the main goals of public authorities for the last decades 
in a lot of developed countries as well as in developing countries, and it is still the case. Such an 
objective manifests itself in the implementation of tax or subsidies policies favoring owner-occupation 
over the other tenure status, that is to say renting (at market or reduced price).  
 
Several researchs addressed tax concessions for owner-occupied housing in the U.S.4, where the 
effectiveness of these public interventions is a very controversial issue5. Rosen & Rosen (1980) use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a description of U.S. tax concessions, see Bourassa & Grigsby (2000). 
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aggregate time series data for 1949 to 1974 to indicate that removal of the personnal income tax 
benefits for homeownership would have led to a 4 percentage points reduction in the homeowners 
level in 1974. More recently, Glaeser & Shapiro (2002) show that the mortgage interest deduction has 
minimal impact on the homeownership rate. Green & Vandell (1999) use 1990 data and find that the 
replacement of the mortgage interest deductibility with a revenue-neutral tax credit can lead to a 3 to 5 
percentage points increase in the homeowership rate. Working on 1989 data for 11 metropolitan areas, 
Bourassa & Yin (2006) conclude that removing the deduction would only have a one percentage 
point-limited negative impact on the ownership level of young households, and that the use of cash 
subsidies in place of tax deductions would have generated no significant improvement for first-time 
homebuyers. Bourassa & Yin (2008) argue that U.S. mortgage interest deduction reduces the 
homeownership rate of young households due to effects on house prices. Hilber & Turner (2013) show 
that the mortgage interest deduction contributes to homeownership attainment only for high-income 
households in place with highly elastic housing supply –where few positive externalities occur, but has 
an adverse effect in all other situations.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, there are few specific studies concerning the effects of policies 
implemented in European countries. Gobillon & le Blanc (2008) analyse the "prêt à taux zéro" –a 
downpayment subsidy to low and middle-income first-time homebuyers– in France6, and observe that 
this mechanism allows some households to leave the rental sector sooner. However, the authors also 
estimate that 85 percent of the beneficiaries in a 4-year period would still have moved to ownership 
without this allowance, what can be described as a strong windfall effect. In their investigation of the 
economic causes of Switzerland's low ownership rate, Bourassa & Hoesli (2008) simulate joint 
changes in taxation and other policies to assess the influences of these variables. According to them, a 
removal of the mortgage interest deduction and other housing expenses along with the imputed rent 
tax –owner-occupied housing is notably subject to property, wealth and imputed rent taxation in 
Switzerland– would reduces the ownership rate by 1 percentage point.  
 
In Belgium, owner-occupation has been promoted since the end of the nineteenth century with the 
implementation of a law supposed to increase the rate of homeowners specifically in working class –
this law will be the starting point of the housing policy in the country. Since that time, homeownership 
policy has been considered as a key element of the Welfare state. The ownership constitutes indeed a 
partial alternative to an imperfect social security (in particular, low public pensions) by protecting 
people against high housing costs at the time of retirement (De Decker & Dewilde, 2010). Tax 
concessions are used to encourage households to acquire their own dwelling. Actually, owner-
occupiers benefit from the neutralization of the imputed rents taxation of their own houses or flats and 
from limited deductibility of mortgage credit repayments (including capital and interest)7. In 2011, 
Belgium spent 0.53 percent of GDP on homeownership-related tax concessions (0.35 percent in 2002). 
According to the work of Heylen (2013) concerning Flanders only, the major part of this public aid 
benefits to higher income mortgagors. Given that the system is shared by the three regions, this 
observation would certainly also be true for Wallonia and Brussels-Capital.  
 
In their studies about homeownership in developing countries, Daniere (1992) and Arimah (1997) 
share the idea that the effectiveness of public policies related to owner-occupation is fundamentally 
based on clear understanding of what determines homeownership. Therefore, the analysis of the tenure 
determinants can provide inputs for the definition or the renewal of housing, taxation and subsidies 
policies. Considering this interest, this paper investigates the issue of households tenure choice 
determinants in Belgium. To this end, the second section reviews previous related research. On the 
basis of this review, a logit model is estimated in the third section using a sample of 6,962 households. 
The methodology, data and results of the estimation are described in a comprehensive way. A 
discussion of the findings and perspectives is provided in the fourth and fifth sections. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The rate of homeowners in the U.S. has been relatively stable over the last decades, varying from 62.1 percent 
in 1960 to 65.1% in 2013 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).  
6 For an introduction to homeownership policies in France, see Laferrère & Le Blanc (2006). 
7 In the case of multi-owners, these tax concessions are only applicable for the main house or flat. 
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Review of previous research about the determinants of housing tenure choice 
 
The issue of housing tenure choice in developed countries gives rise to an extensive literature. 
However, while studies concerning the U.S. are many, the literature exploring the situation of other 
countries is less substantial8. 
 
A first strand of studies explores the tenure behaviour of households and typically models the 
likelihood of homeownership as a function of household's demographic attributes, income, and 
housing costs. Early works show that the income and demographic variables exert major influences on 
the housing tenure (Kain & Quigley, 1972; Carliner, 1974). Goodman (1988, 1990) argues that 
permanent income –which describes the flow of income over life according to the human capital of the 
household– reflects better the influence of income on the tenure choice. Haurin, Hendershott & Kim 
(1994) and Bourassa (1995) emphasize the role of the relative cost of owning and renting –which 
mainly depends on the national tax policy– and show that the inclusion of the user costs results in a 
significant improvement of the models. Furthermore, several studies consider in particular the 
differences between ethnic groups regarding the likelihood of being a homeowner. Skaburskis (1996) 
analyses the situation of African and Caribbean minorities in Toronto, and observes that the large gap 
in homeownership compared to white people is not entirely the consequence of differences in 
incomes, preferences and demographic characteristics. Hilber & Liu (2008) show that most of the 
dissimilarity in homeownership between African-American and white American can be attributed to 
differences in locational preferences and wealth. Painter, Yang & Yu (2004) argue that spatial 
concentration and wealth enable Chinese American to reach similar levels of homeownership than 
white American.  
 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the role of credit accessibility on ownership attainment. 
Artle & Varaiya (1978) develop a theoretical continuous-time life-cycle model and show the effect of 
the down payment constraint on tenure choice. Due to the durable nature of housing, buying a house 
or flat require most households to recourse to external financing. In order to mitigate the risk related to 
information asymmetry, lenders generally require a down payment9. This condition forces households 
to rent until they possess the necessary savings to meet the constraint. Brueckner (1986) proposes a 
two-period model to emphasize in a simplier way the trade-off between renting and owning and the 
role of the down payment mechanism. In addition, Haurin, Hendershott & Wachter (1996) analyse the 
impact of mortgage lender imposed borrowing constraints on the tenure choice. Information 
asymmetry implies that lenders evaluate the borrowing capacity of households on the basis of their 
current income and liquid assets (rather than future income and total wealth), what restricts 
significantly homeownership attainment for certain households (in particular young households).   
 
A large body of work consider the role of risk, uncertainty and transaction costs. Henderson & 
Ioannides (1983) include the tenure choice in the broader framework of the portfolio problem, and 
analyse the trade-off between the risk of ownership and the rental externality –which implies that 
tenants do not face the social marginal costs of their utilization of the housing. Due to strong 
difficulties to diversify, the household's preference regarding risk has an influence on the tenure 
choice. Robst, Deitz & McGoldrick (1999) and Ortalo-Magné & Rady (2002) emphasize the role of 
uncertainty by showing that the likelihood of ownership increases with the security and stability of 
income; therefore the likelihood of being a homeowner decreases with income uncertainty and the risk 
of being unemployed. Haurin & Gill (2002) show the importance of the expected length of stay on the 
tenure choice. According to them, a high level of expected mobility increases the likelihood of renting 
rather than owning, due to the transaction costs associated with homeownership.  
 
Lastly, more recent studies suggest a connection between the tenure and the structure type of housing. 
Assuming that costs of coordinating maintenance or investment decisions scale up with the size of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This observation is shared by Boehm & Schlottmann (2014). 
9 The down payment constraint varies significantly from a country to another. See Chiuri & Jappelli (2003).  
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building, the concentration of ownership is more efficient and owner-occupation is consequently less 




Modelling methodology and variables 
 
This section proposes a classical econometric model of housing tenure choice for Belgium. According 
to the classification recently established by Raya & Garcia (2012), classical models use cross-
sectionnal data to describe the likelihood of a household being a homeowner at a given time, and they 
could from this angle be opposed to models in which the dependent variable expresses the transition 
from renting to owning. Moreover, classical models use a sample of all households and, this way, 
model the cumulative homeownership attainment, while 'recent movers models' are estimated on the 
basis of samples of recent movers that have therefore made their tenure choice (Painter, 2000). The 
classical model may also be justified by the fact that homeownership is a long-term decision supported 
with anticipated future needs as much as present needs (Edin & Englund, 1991; Wachter & 
Megbolugbe, 1992). It is also generally admitted that classical models consider only housing tenure 
choice from a static perspective and then may reflect the lagged effects of earlier decisions (Di Salvo 
& Ermisch, 1997; Painter, Gabriel & Myers, 2001). Notwithstanding, the classical model seems to be 
the most useful model in order to describe the profile of the homeowner at a given time and not to 
explain the ownership decision per se. 
 
Guided by the findings of previous research, the model developed in this section focuses on the role of 
income, demographic attributes and location characteristics as determinants of homeownership. 
Income and demographic attributes remain, according to the literature, the most robust variables (Raya 
& Garcia, 2012). In addition, the underlying significations of these variables are relevant regarding the 
literature reviewed earlier. According to Bourassa & Peng (2011), income affects the tenure choice 
through the mortgage accessibility and through the impact of income tax rates on the relative cost of 
owning and renting. In addition, income is closely related to wealth, which is often considered for its 
important role in the borrowing constraints and in particular in the down payment requirement. 
Regarding demographic variables, Bourassa (2000) argues that they reveal the household's phase in 
the life-cycle. The relationship status and the presence of dependent children can provide indications 
about the stable or mobile nature of the household (Carliner, 1974). Couples with dependent children 
are indeed expected to have a greater stability than single households. With regard to age, older 
households are assumed to be more likely to have acquired the required savings to meet the minimum 
down payment constraint (Bourassa, 1995). The introduction of ethnicity-related variables can be done 
in order to evaluate the presence of discrimination in the attainment of homeownership (notably 
regarding housing costs and credit accessibility). Finally, locational variables can reflect the link 
between the physical characteristics of housing (which is related to the urbanization type) and the 
tenure status of the households (Glaeser, 2011).  
 
In the context of an initial analysis, it seems relevant to limit the number and the complexity of the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the model is formally written as: 
 𝐻𝑂 = 𝑓(𝐼𝑁𝐶,𝐷𝐸𝑀, 𝐿𝑂𝐶) (1) 
 
Where 𝐻𝑂 is the status of homeowner, INC is a measure of the household's income, DEM is a vector 
of demographic attributes of the household, and LOC is a vector of location's characteristics. A precise 
definition of the variables composing the model and the expected signs of the related parameters are 
presented in table 2.  
 
A logit procedure is used in order to estimate the model of housing tenure. The logistic regression 
model is a statistical classification model which is commonly used in discrete data analysis, and in 
housing tenure choice analysis in particular (Iwarere & Williams, 1991). Specifically, the logit is 
defined as the natural logarithmic value of the odds in favor of a given event (Li, 1977), that is: 
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𝐿! =   ln 𝑃!1   −   𝑃!   =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑋! + 𝑢! (2) 
 
The model is based on the cumulative logistic distribution function 𝑃!: 
 𝑃! =   𝐸(𝑌 = 1 𝑋!) = 11 + 𝑒!(!!!!!!!)   (3.1) 𝑃! = 11 + 𝑒!!! = 𝑒!1 + 𝑒! (3.2) 
 
Where:  
 𝑍! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋! (3.3) 
 
The ratio 𝑃! / (1 - 𝑃!) in equation (2) represents the odds ratio, i.e. the odds that an event occurs (Y=1) 
to the odds it does not occur (Y=0); 𝑃! is the probability that the output variable be equal to one (Y=1); 𝑋! are the input (explicative) variables; 𝑒 is the base of the natural logarithm (2.71828); β are the 
parameters. The estimated probabilities lie between 0 and 1 (𝑃 ranges from 0 to 1) and they are 
nonlinearly related to the explanatory variables. The logits are not so bounded as 𝐿 goes from -∞ to 
+∞. Although 𝐿 is linear in 𝑋, the probabilities themselves are not. This property is in contrast with the 
linear probability model (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Table 2. Expected influences of the explanatory variables 
 
Variables Definitions Expected influences 
INC Monthly after-tax income of the household (Categories, in euros). 
Increasing positive influence with the 
increase of income. 
AGE Average age of the household's members (head and partner) (Categories, in years). 
Increasing positive influence with the ageing 
of the household's members, except the 
oldest category. 
COUPLE 
Dummy variable of the household's 
relationship status: equals 1 if is in couple, 0 
if single. 
Positive influence of couple status; negative 
influence of single status. 
DCHILD Number of dependent children in the household (Continuous). 
Positive influence of the presence of 
dependent children. 
NAT 
Dummy variable of the household's 
nationality: equals 1 if at least one member 
(head or partner) is Belgian, 0 otherwise. 
Positive influence of Belgian nationality. 
DENS 
Average number of inhabitants by 100 
square meters in the municipality 
(Continuous). 
Negative influence of high density. 





Data used to estimate the model have been collected for the Belgian Daily Mobility Survey 
'BELDAM' in 2010. The data are available on request to the persons in charge of this survey. The 
methodology for data collection is outlined in the final report (freely downloadable on the official 
website). The initial database contains 8,526 individual observations and many variables relating to 
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the daily mobility behaviour of each individual, which is the focus of this survey. Nevertheless, 
information about housing tenure status, life-cycle characteristics, income and location of the 
respondents is contained in the database and have been extracted for the need of this study. Out of 
these, observations containing at least one missing or incoherent value have been deleted. At the end, 
6,962 observations have been accepted. Some descriptive statistics of the sample are provided below. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the sample among the different tenure status. It can be observed that 
the distribution between owners (0.706) and renters (0.294) in the sample is very close to the 
distribution of the population stated in the introduction of this paper. 
 





Owners 0.8080 0.7740 
Tenants 0.1920 0.2260 
Wallonia 
Owners 0.7602 0.7280 
Tenants 0.2398 0.2720 
Brussels Capital 
Owners 0.5100 0.4480 
Tenants 0.4900 0.5520 
Total 
Owners 0.7055 0.7270 
Tenants 0.2945 0.2730 
Source (for the population): Winters & Heylen (2013) 
  
 
Table 4 provides key statistics about some variables used in the model. It can be observed that 
homeownership is present in all categories of income and age, but is more present in the higher 
income and age categories. Couples are clearly more owners than tenants, while the difference is less 
obvious in the case of single households. Belgian households are predominantly owners, but it is also 
the case for non-Belgian households. In addition, owners have, on average, more dependent children 




The classical measurement of the goodness-of-fit (𝑅!) is not significative in the case of binary models. 
Therefore, the 'McFadden pseudo-R2' (noted '𝑅!"! ') –which can be used as a goodness-of-fit indicator 
in the case of binary models, is calculated as: 
 𝑅!"! = 1 − log 𝐿log 𝐿!  (4) 
 
Where log 𝐿 is the log-likelihood of the estimated model and log 𝐿! is the log-likelihood of the trivial 
model. In other words, the minimum value of the 𝑅!"!  is obtained when log 𝐿 = log 𝐿!, that is to say 
when the estimated model does not produce better results than the trivial model, and this value is equal 
to 0. On the opposite, the estimated model would be perfect if log 𝐿 = 0, and consequently 𝑅!"! = 1. 
As shown in table 5, in the case of the model developed in this paper, 𝑅!"!  reaches relatively low 
values compared to the perfect regression. However, pseudo-R2 interpretations are very controversial 
and cannot be considered in an isolated way (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Following Gujarati (2003), the goodness-of-fit of a binary model could be estimated in a simplier way 
by comparing the number of correct previsions of the model with the number of total observations in 
the sample. In this case, 77.28% of the observations are correctly predicted by the model, what may be 
considered as a good result when taking into consideration the limited number of explanatory 
variables used, and their simple nature.  
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Table 4. Main descriptive statistics 
 
 Distribution 
Income (euros) Owners Tenants 
1 0 to 999 0.3801 0.6199 
2 1,000 to 1,499 0.5840 0.4160 
3 1,500 to 1,999 0.6882 0.3118 
4 2,000 to 2,999 0.7968 0.2032 
5 3,000 to 4,999 0.8814 0.1186 
6 5,000 and more 0.8613 0.1387 
Age (years) Owners Tenants 
1 18-24 0.1429 0.8571 
2 25-34 0.4698 0.5302 
3 35-44 0.6575 0.3425 
4 45-54 0.7330 0.2670 
5 55-64 0.7810 0.2190 
6 65-74 0.7893 0.2107 
7 75 and more 0.7657 0.2343 
Relationship status Owners Tenants 
Couple 0.8466 0.1534 
Single 0.5702 0.4298 
Dependent children Owners Tenants 
Mean 0.46111563 0.2912195 
Stand. dev. 0.8778564 0.7230237 
Nationality Owners Tenants 
Belgian 0.7249 0.2751 
Other 0.6365 0.3635 
Density of population  
in the municipality 
(inhabitants / 100 m2) 
Owners Tenants 
Mean 0.24455216 0.52671347 
Stand. dev. 0.5691221 0.8739081 
Jobs by inhabitants  
in the municipality 
Owners Tenants 
Mean 0.40740517 0.51586978 
Stand. dev. 0.2199639 0.3030775 
 
 




(trivial model includes the intercept) 
McFadden pseudo-R2 
"equal share" 
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Marginal effects and odds ratios 
 
Table 6 presents the coefficients of the logit model obtained by computing the data in Stata. All the 
coefficients are statistically significant at 5 per cent level. However, in binary models, only the signs 
of the β coefficients are interpretable as such, and the information they provide remains limited to the 
way (positive or negative) the probability varies compared with the given basis situation. In order to 
outline the amplitude of these influences, the marginal effects can be calculated. In fact, the marginal 
effects represent the variation of the homeownership probability in the case of a marginal change in 
one parameter (all other things remaining equal), still compared with the basis household.  
 
Table 6. Estimated coefficients 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
INC1 -1.218889 .1109333 -10.99 0.000 
INC2 -.5277411 .0889177 -5.94 0.000 
INC4 .4131617 .0974442 4.24 0.000 
INC5 1.009172 .1182426 8.53 0.000 
INC6 .8868711 .1834163 4.84 0.000 
COUPLE .6471023 .0769786 8.41 0.000 
DCHILD .1319412 .0463896 2.84 0.004 
NAT .2359584 .0717799 3.29 0.001 
AGE1 -1.639549 .3601305 -4.55 0.000 
AGE2 -.6324847 .1107233 -5.71 0.000 
AGE4 .4038807 .1009173 4.00 0.000 
AGE5 .9059122 .1071541 8.45 0.000 
AGE6 1.181379 .1170152 10.10 0.000 
AGE7 1.310835 .1203861 10.89 0.000 
DENS -.6302459 .0632377 -9.97 0.000 
JOB -1.077692 .1192323 -9.04 0.000 
Constant .5806689 .1297244 4.48 0.000 
 
 
The marginal effects are presented in table 7. For dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated 
for a discrete change from 0 to 1. For DENS and JOB variables, the marginal effect is calculated at 
means (respectively at 0.301447 and 0.439343). For DCHILD, it is calculated at 0. The basis 
household has the following characteristics: a monthly income between 1500 and 1999 euros (INC3), 
a head's age between 35 and 44 years (AGE3), single (COUPLE=0) and non-Belgian (NAT=0). The 
variables contained in the model influence the probability of homeownership in the generally expected 
way according to the literature reviewed earlier. Going up the income categories has a positive 
influence on the probability of homeownership, while going down has a negative influence. The 
influence of age follows a similar pattern, that is to say younger households having a lower likelihood 
of being homeowners than older ones. A couple relationship status, dependent children and the 
Belgian nationality have a positive influence (respectively +0.152, +0.033 and +0.059). Concerning 
the locational variables, the urbanity (represented by the density of population) and the centrality 
(represented by the number of jobs per inhabitant) has a negative influence on homeownership 
probability. On the whole, income, head's age and relationship status have the strongest influences. In 
addition, locational variables also exert a notable influence. 
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Table 7. Marginal effects 
 
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| 
INC1* -.2819995 .02415 -11.68 0.000 
INC2* -.1307808 .02183 -5.99 0.000 
INC4* .0996986 .02331 4.28 0.000 
INC5* .2235406 .02467 9.06 0.000 
INC6* .2006404 .03705 5.41 0.000 
COUPLE* .1518151 .01732 8.76 0.000 
DCHILD .0327926 .01153 2.84 0.004 
NAT* .0589031 .0179 3.29 0.001 
AGE1* -.3537515 .05669 -6.24 0.000 
AGE2* -.1558038 .02684 -5.81 0.000 
AGE4* .0975521 .02439 4.00 0.000 
AGE5* .2042976 .02444 8.36 0.000 
AGE6* .2533747 .02503 10.12 0.000 
AGE7* .2739271 .02495 10.98 0.000 
DENS -.156641 .01572 -9.97 0.000 
JOB -.267849 .02963 -9.04 0.000 
*for discrete change from 0 to 1 
 
Table 8. Odds ratios 
 
 Odds ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| 
INC1 .2955583 .0327873 -10.99 0.000 
INC2 .589936 .0524557 -5.94 0.000 
INC4 1.511589 .1472956 4.24 0.000 
INC5 2.74333 .3243785 8.53 0.000 
INC6 2.427522 .4452473 4.84 0.000 
COUPLE 1.909998 .1470289 8.41 0.000 
DCHILD 1.141041 .0529325 2.84 0.004 
NAT 1.266122 .0908821 3.29 0.001 
AGE1 .1940675 .0698896 -4.55 0.000 
AGE2 .5312701 .058824 -5.71 0.000 
AGE4 1.497625 .1511363 4.00 0.000 
AGE5 2.474188 .2651195 8.45 0.000 
AGE6 3.258865 .3813366 10.10 0.000 
AGE7 3.709268 .4465444 10.89 0.000 
DENS .5324609 .0336716 -9.97 0.000 
JOB .3403803 .0405843 -9.04 0.000 
Constant 1.787234 .2318478 4.48 0.000 
 
 
However, these influences remain questionable because in such models, the marginal effects are not 
constant and depend on the point of the independent variable at which they are evaluated. 
Consequently, it could be useful to calculate the odds ratios, which constitute another (and sometimes 
considered as easier) way to interpret the coefficients of the model. In fact, odds ratios express the 
multiplicative effect between the probability, and not the probability itself. In a theoretical way, the 
odds ratio for 𝑌 = 1 with a given 𝑋 can be written as: 
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𝑂𝑅(𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑌 = 1 𝑋)𝑃(𝑌 = 0 𝑋) = 𝑃(𝑌 = 1 𝑋)1 − 𝑃(𝑌 = 1 𝑋) (5) 
 
The odds ratios are provided in table 8. It can be observed that the probability of being a homeowner 
is almost three times superior for a household with a monthly income between 3,000 and 4,999 euros 
than for a household with a monthly income between 1,500 and 1,999 euros, while the latter has 
already three times more probabilities to be a homeowner than a household with a monthly income 
between 0 and 999 euros. Concerning age, the homeownership probability of young households (18-
24 years) is remarkably inferior to the basis household of our model (35-44 years) –only 19% of the 




This paper proposes an econometric model of housing tenure in Belgium. The issue of housing tenure 
choice has been at the heart of numerous studies concerning the U.S. case, but the literature exploring 
the situation of other countries is less substantial. This study presents a first insight in the field of 
housing tenure choice in Belgium, and an additional analysis for the continental Western Europe.  
 
A brief review of the previous related literature shows that many authors focus on the roles that 
mortgage accessibility, risk, uncertainty and transaction costs play in homeownership attainment. In 
addition, homeownership is also often modelled as a function of household's demographic attributes, 
income and housing costs. It is hypothesized that the underlying signification of these last variables 
are relevant regarding the determinants of ownership listed just above. Consequently, the model 
developed in this paper includes variables related to income –which exerts an influence through 
mortgage constraints and the relative cost of owning and renting, life-cycle variables –relevant 
regarding the stability of the household and the down payment constraint– and locational variables –in 
order to show the influence of housing structure on the choices of households. Moreover, a variable of 
nationality is also introduced in the model with the aim of identifying potential discrimination 
regarding homeownership attainment.  
 
In comparison with the expected influences of the parameters based on the literature review, the 
observations follow clearly the general trends. Higher income have positive influence on owner-
occupation, what may be explained by an easier access to credit, an easier settling of savings to meet 
the down payment constraint, or also by a higher taste for privacy that involves consequently a 
preference for ownership from households with high income. However, it can be pointed out that the 
highest income group does not follow this trend and has a weaker influence on the probability of 
homeownership than high incomes groups. This situation could be explained by the fact that the 
highest income group contain very specific socio-economic and professional profiles that require 
sometimes high residential mobilty, which is hardly compatible with homeownership (notably due to 
transaction costs). Average age of the household influences the probability of homeownership in the 
same way than income. Actually, age may be related to wealth accumulation, what is necessary to 
meet the minimum down payment constraint when acquiring a house or a flat. However, the oldest 
groups may be expected to have a lower probability of homeowner status, because of specific needs 
linked to the third-age endowments. Nevertheless, it is not observed in this analysis. Age could be 
closely related to income and would consequently introduce endogeneity in the model. Couple status 
and the presence of dependent children have also a positive influence on homeownership. These life-
cycle variables give indeed some indications about the stability of the household's housing demand 
that logically increase the likelihood of homeownership. Moreover, the presence of dependent children 
could involve higher requirements in terms of, amongst others, space or dwelling's characteristics, and 
therefore encourage the household to own its housing. Finally, locations presenting a high density of 
population and a high centrality are associated, in Belgium as in several other countries, with a lower 
probability of homeownership compared with other areas. This observation can be explained by the 
higher coordination costs of multi-family residential buildings that make them less likely to be owner-
occupied, or by a trade-off between commuting cost and housing expenditures.  
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The observations stated and the methodology used in this paper constitute a robust framework for in-
depth research, in particular with the objective of identifying the target population that should benefit 
from public aid or with the aim of measuring the effects of public policies. Some extensions are 




This paper assesses the determinants of housing tenure choice in Belgium with a general approach. 
For further research on the Belgian case, one major improvement should be considered above all: the 
relative cost of owning and renting should be modelled and introduced in the model. This approach 
seems to be the most relevant way to analyse the influence of tax and housing policies on the choice of 
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